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I n t r o d u c t i o n.
It seems to us that in ancient times the remedy for
injuries was limited afrainst, the immediate or visible lrronl.-
doers. Mr. Justice Holmes thinks that the remedy was in
early tilnes against the imrTnediate cause of damacTe, ever in-
anini,te, the omer of whch 7Tas therefore bound to surrender
it (noo:ae dedtio), though in later times he was allowed to
redeem the offending property by a money payment. 'Phis is
reversing the order of ideas which looks upon the surrender
as having been a substitute for payment. (The Common Law,
page 16). But the advanced state of human affairs found
this inadequate, and the principle that a principal or em-
ployer is responsible for the acts of his affents or employ-
ees, either when expressly or impliedly authorized by hi -i,
was soon egtablished. This rule is, in the words of Chief
Justice Shaw of Mass., obviouslyI founded on the great prin-
ciple of social duty, that every man, in the management of
his own affairs, whether by himself or bv his agents or ser-
vants, shall so conduct thea as not to injure another.
It is the great advantage of the common la,'T that it is more
flexible or capable of being modified than the statute law.
It does not, strictly speaking, give general propositions
in definite terms, but decides each particular case accord-
ing to the practical needs and justice of human affairs, and
finding that the rule above stated is improper in some in-
stances, it did not fail in its work, and modified it and
exempted the emnplover's liability ir case the person injured
is also his emTploye. But once established principle is
applied to new instances so far as cases present their like-
ness and it can not be changed ,vhollv nor abolished by the
judicial authority. On the other hand, our society devel-
opes fron time to time, from day to day, and new businesses
come up one after another, and an old principle of law does
not give a proper remedy, or sometimes works a hardship or
prevents the management of a new business. But the law,
being a creature of necessity, adapted to the business and
welfare of the co'in unitv, it must be so modified or even
changed by the legislature that it is able to give proper
regulation.
The modern corporate business having groim so rapidly
in the last half century, and as the nature, its business
being performed by its agents or officers, the relation of
master and servant was a great subject of litigation. We
intend in this short paper to state, as briefly and as
plainly as possible, the principle, origin, and growth of
the subject under consideration, and how it developed to its
present condition.
The R elation of EmploVer and Employee.
In considerin. my subject, it may be necessary to de-
vote a preliminarv remnark to the relation of employTer and
employee; in other words what constitute the relation of
master and servant? or more shortlV, who is a master and
who is a servant? The common understanding of the words
master and servant and the legTal understandinq are not the
same; the latter is broader, and comprehends somse cases in
which the parties are master and servant only in a peculiar
perhaps only for a sinale purpose.
sense and for a certain purpose; To avoid this ambiquity
the words employer and employee are used synonVmously with
master and servant in the legal sense.
The relation of employer and employee exists between
two parties if one has the order and control of the work
done by the other. An employer is one who not only pre-
scribes to the workman the end of his work, but directs, or
at any moment _may direct the means also, or as it has been
put, "retains the power of controlinq the work"; and he who
does work on those terms is in law an employee for Tkhose
to be
acts, neqlects, and defaults, to the extentAspecified, the
employer is liable.
Pollock on torts P.69; Sadler vs. FTenlocIt (1885) 4 E.8- B.
570,578; 24 L.J.Q.B. 138,141; Cooley on Torts,p.692,624;
Laurrher v. Pointer, 5 B.& C. 647.
But a contractor, sub-contractor, or other person exercis-
in(T an independent employment, is not an employee TwJithin the
meaninq of the rule. He is not under the order or control
of the person for whoni he does it, and he may use his own
discretion in things not specified beforehand, but he under-
takes onlv to produce a given result.
Underhill's Law of Torts, (4th edition) p.58, 54.
Tbus a contractor employed by naviaation commissioners
in the course of executing the works, flooded the plaintiff'S
land, by improperly and wvithout authority, introducing the
water itto a drain insufficiently made by hi-Riself. Here
the contractor, and not the commissioners, w1as held liable.
Ailen v. ow,rard,7Q. B. 960.
Again 'IT-here a conpany contracted with P. to construct a
rai]lav, and A. sub-contracted with B. to construct a
bridge on it, and B. emploved C. to erect a scaffold under
a special contract betw, een hi-a and C., a passenger injured
by the ne(Tlirrent construction of the scaffold could sue only
6C., and not PL. , 1R. , or the co panIr; but such a case would be
very restricted to apply, because the original employer re-
tains his control, though not exercisel practically, over
the contractor, or personally interferes and -takes hi!self
n, party to the act ',hiCh occasions the darianTe, he iv ill be
liable. KniJhlt v. Gex. 5 Exch. 721.
Above ill, the leqal criterio-a of the relation of an ei-
plover to an emnployee is the power of controlling the work.
Thus a person who is habitually the servant of A. may be-
come, for a certain tiie and for the purpose of certain
work, the servant of B., even although the hand to pay hivi
is still A's. This is a case of te-nporarV transfer of
service. Murray v. Currie, L. R. 3 C. P. 24.
ERployer's liability to his efiployee.
Havinr seen in the preceeding statements ,-rbo is an em-
ployer and rho is an enployee, we are going to enter into
our proper field; i.e. Employer's liability for dam aqes suf-
ferel b v emplovee in the perforlance of his mork. An en-
plover's liability for da nares to his eployee "lay arise in
two Ways,
I. From his oW-n neffli(Tence.
II. From the ne~qlicence of another or co-e:nploye.
ATe will consider hereafter, in orter, what is the liability
of an ermploVer in these cases, and first, the neclient acts
of tbe employer.
I. Neglihjence of Employer.
It is a general rule that an employer is bouni to take
reasonable precautions to insure the safetv of his employees;
to say more specifically, he owes to the employee to provide_
(a) safe place to wArork, (b) safe machinery, tools and. appli-
ances, (c) competent and skilful emplovees, if any, (d)
reasonable rules and rerulations, if co-emplovees are num-
erous, (e) and some other special act according to the cir-
cu nstances. If he neglect these, the employer is, (eneral-
iy speakinq, liable for an injury caused on account of it.
7Tre will consider more in detail of what the e-nployer's ne(T-
ligence may consist.
(A). Safe place to y iork. The emplover's negligence
m-av consist in subjecting the employee to the dangers of
One of the defendants was manager of the mine, and it was
worked under his personal superintendence, and the plain-
tiff was not aware of the state of the shaft.
unsafe buildings, or to other perils on his own premises.
This rule was established by public policy and common jus-
tice. A man can not be understood as contracting to take
upon himself risks which he neither knows nor suspects, nor
has reason to anticipate.
Marshall v. Stewart, 83 Eng. L.& Eq. 1; Ashwix v.
Stanwvix, 80 L.J.,0.B. 183; Coole on Torts, p.648.
Thus in Mellors v. Shaw (30 L.J.,.Q.B° 383) the defend-
ants were owners of a coal mine, and the plaintiff was em-
ployed by them as a collier in the mine, and in the course
of his employment it was necessary for him to descend and
ascend through a shaft constructed by them. By the defend-
ants' negligence,the shaft was constructed unsafely, and was
by reason of not being sufficiently lined or cased, in an
unsafe condition. By reason of this, and also by reason
of no sufficient or proper apparatus having been provided
by the defendants to protect their miners from the unsafe
state of the shaft, a stone fell from the side of the shaft
C on to the plaintiff's head, and he was dangerously wounded.
o this state of facts the defendants were held liable.
So, where an emplover ordered an eFaplo5Tee to take a bag of
corn up 9, ladder which the emplovee kneipw, and the emploTee
did not know to be unsafe, and the ladder broke and the em-
ployee was injured, the employer was held liable.
Williarms v. Clouqb, S E.& N. 258; Underhill's LaVr of
Torts, p. 66-67;. Wheeler v. Mason Manf. Co., 185 Mass.
294; Pantzar v. Tilly Foster Min. Co., 9 T.Y. 868.
In the case of Wheeler v. Mason kfanf. Co. the Mass. court
throu h Allen, J., said: "We are of opinion that the duty
resting upon the master is not merely one of reasonable care
and diliqence to give a, proper notice, but that he is respon-
sible in case the servant suffers through a want of receiv-
ing , proper notice of the risks to which he is exposed.
The servant does not assune, and is not to bear the ri-,k of
unknon and undiscovered perils; but he is held to take
those risks which are kno-rm or which, by the exercise of
ordinarv care, he ought to knowAr, to be incident to the na-
ture of the business in the place where and in the nanner
in which it is carried on.'
The same view was, substantially, taken in the 'PeATr
York court above cited. It says: "The rule that the serv-
ant takes the risk of the service presupposes that tile as-
ter has perforied the duties of caution, care and viqilance
T ihich the lar cast upon him. It is those risks alone
which can not be obviated by the odoption of reasonable
measures of precaution bv the master, that the servant as-
sumes. "
But wihen the ernployree kne,V, or ought to knovv in the
circumstances, the danger, he can not, generally speakinG,
recover for an injurv suffered; but this refers not only to
the safety of place, but to all the other cases, and we wvill
notice this subject in a subsequent part, that is, when ve
treat of the contributory nerqliTence of the employee.
Application and odification of the rule.
1. This rule has been applied aqainst railroad conp-
anies in the case of injuries to their employees in conse-
auence of the road-bed beinrT out of repair. The emplover
is bound to -ake reasonable efforts to keep it in repair.
Sno- v. Hoasatonhe R.P.Co. 8 Allen 441; Elmer v.
Locke, 1r5 Mass. 575.
In the case of Elmer v. Locke it was decided that a
breaknan in the'lemploynent of a railroad corpor3,tion may
maintain an action arainst the corporation fov personal in-
juries occasioned, while in the exercise of due care, bv tfB
fall of a trestle-,rork supportinqj a, portion of a spur track,
wkhich tvas intended for use for an indefinite period of tirne
if the fall is caused partly bv the defective construction
of the trestle work, and partlir by the neqliqence of the
fellow-serw, nt of the plaintiff.
2. But a railroad company is not responsible to one
of its employees for an injury occasioned by a latent de-
fect in one of its bridges, where the company employed con-
petent persons to supervise and inspect the bride, bv whom
the refect TrA not dJscovered.
Warner v. Erie R.R.Co. q9 -F.Y. 468; Ladd v. Ne,,i
Bedford &c., R..R.Co. 119 Mklass. 412; Cooper v. Ham-
ilton Manf. Co. 14 Allen, 198.
In the case of Wlarner v. Erie P.R.Co., Bacon,J., del-
iverin the opinion of the court, said: "The true princi-
ple applicable here is that, when the defendant has erected
a structure to be used in its oriinary and accustoned buis-
iness, ",without fault a9 to plan, node of construction and
character of naterials so that it was oririnally sufficient
for all the purposes for which it is used, emplovs skillful
and trustworthy agents to supervise, examinand test it,
and that duty is performed with frequency, and with such
tests as custom and experience have sanctioned and prescrib-
ed, it has exercised such care and skill as the law exacts
of an emplo rer in reference to his emnployee, and that no
liability can attach to, a party for a defect in such struc-
ture by which an employee has sustained an injury, unless
there has been actual notice or knowledge that defects ex-
isted which, unless promptly remedied, would be liable to
produce serious or fatal consequences."
The Mass. Courts decided just by the same view.
3. The employer is not bound to use the newest or
safest appliances, but reasonably safe ones.
Hull v. Hall, 7S 4le. 114; Probst v. Delanater, 100
W.Y. 266; Hickev v. Taaffe, 105 N.Y. 2?6.
(B). Safe machinery, tools and appliances.
The employer m'ay also be neGligent in not exercising
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ordinary care to provide suitable and safe machinerv, tools
or appliances.
Readhead v. Midland R. Co., 2 0.B. 412,L.R. 4 Q.B.879,
The nodifications.
1. But he is not quarantor of the safety of machin-
erv and is responsible only where he has failed to employ
reasonable care and skill in its selection.
Ladd v. Newr Bedford R.R.Co. 119 Mass. 412; Painton
v. Nor. Cent. Ac. Co. 88 N.Y. .7
If, therefore, an injury results to the employees, from a
failure to exercise reasonable care and prudence in this
regard, the employer may be and ought to be held respons-
ible.
Keegan v. 7Testern R.R.Co. 8 N.Y. 175; Hackett v.
Middlesex Manf. Co. 101 Mass. 101; Laninq -#. N.Y.Cent.
R.R.Co. 49 N.Y. .521; Ill.Cent. ..R. v. .Velch, 59 Ill.
p. !g3.
9. The employer is not bound to adopt the newest and
safest appliances, but reasonably safe ones, or to change
or supposed improvment
its -aclii.erv in order to apply everv new inprovement Ain
appliances. Wonder v. B.&r O.tR.R.Co. 09 -d. 411; Hull v.
Hall, 78 A4e. 114; Probst v. Delamater, 1.00 7.7. 286
Hickey i. Taaffe, 105 N.Y. 26.
14
2. He must make reasonable efforts to keep his machin-
erv in repair; this duty is like that to furnish orininallv
safe machinery and can not escape bv deieqation.
(Solomon .R.Co. v. Jones, S0 Kas. 301; Richmond etc. Co.
v. Moore, 79 V,9. q3; Fuller v. Jewett, 90 N.Y. 46.)
In the case of Solomon PR Co. v. Jones, Bre-ver, J.,
deliverinr the opinion of the court, said: " It 'rilJl not be
doubted that the duty of the companv is not only in the
first instance to lake reasonable efforts to supplr .achin-
ervgtools ' -,c. , safe and sufficient, but also to ,iake like
efforts to keep such machinerv &-c. in good condition, and
to this end must make all reasonable and necessarv inspec-
tions ,,nd examination.s", and cited many authorities.
In Fuller v. Jewett (80 N.V. 46) it was decided that
wAThere an enqTineer upon a railroad locomotive was killed by
an explosion of a boiler which had been for some time out
of repair, and had been frequentlv reported and sent to the
repair shop for repairs, that defendant Who i.ap, ooern,,tin.
the road was not excused fro'n liabilitV by the facts that
there a no neglifrence on his part in the emplovient of a
superintendent of repairs, or in omittinq to make proper
reaulations, that the inaster nechanic having charrre gave
proper instruction for the thorough examination and repair
of the engine, and that the negligence causinq the accident
was that of the mechanics directed to make the repairs.
(C). Competent and skillful employees, if any.
consist
The e-plover's negliqence may alsoAin employinq employees
who are wantinr in the requisite care, skill or prudence
for the business entrusted to thein.
(Alabama, R-c. .P.Co. v. Waller, 48 Ala. 459; Mich. Cent. P.P
v. Dolan, R2 Mich. 510;' U..8,c.R.R.Co. v. Wrilder, 116 Ill./00)
Alderson, B., in Hutchinson v. Ry. Co., (5 Exch.843)
says: "The servant w.hen he engages to run the risks of the
service, including those arisibr fron the neglifgence of fel-
low servants, has a riqbt to understand that the master has
taker reasonable care to protect from such risks, bv asso-
ciatin him onlv with persons of ordinary skill and care."
Grav, J., in Gilman v. Eiastern R.R.Co., (12 4llen 428) savs
A railroad corporation is bound to provide proper road,
machinerv and equipment, and proper servants. it mnust do
16
th i s throumrh api'ropri ate ( ffi ce r . If )ctinflcT thromrh np-
nropriate officers it kr-orinlgl and neqlirfently emplovs a
iiicorpetent 9ervnts, it is liable for .n injurY, occasioned
to a fellorT servant by their ineonpetency"
( T,,nnj.n v. ,eCent . P.- . G 49 N,.Y. 511.)
,Applicption ai6. moclification of the rule.
1. De,rr e of care to select employees. Gener ally
speakin r, the eiiplover is only required to exeTci se ordina-
r I care and prudence Then he hires anv erplov , but this is
rather to be considered according to each particular case.
It is not enough that such care as is ordinary is used if
I
that is not reasonable under all ciruumstances.
(Mobile 8 Rc. R.R. Co. v. Thon as, 42 Ala. 672, 715; Ala. c.
.P.Co. v. ,rpjler, 4', Ala. 459; Wabash RV. Co. v. 'ffc.Dan-
iels, 107 U.S. .454.)
2. The employer does not warrant or rTuarantee the
fitness or competencTr of his eirploes.
(C.C.,V J.C. , c. Co. v. Troesh, 68 Ill. 545, 4P Me. 291.)
This is settled rule fron ouite early as Pristlv case.
8. It is not enourh that the enplolTer selects one or
17
more agents of approved skill and fitness, and confers up-
on them the power of hiring. These are the duties to be
performed by the employer himself and any person wxho was
put to perform those stands just in the same position with
the employer. If any injury arise from negligence of
such agent, the ernployer is liable as his own negligence.
(Lanning v. N.Y.Cent.,c.R.R.Co. 49 N.Y. 591; Malone v.
Hathawaxr 34 N.Y. .5-P.)
4. If the employer continue incompetent persons in
his employ after their unfitness becoile know-n, or when,
by the exercise of ordinary care, it would have known, he
is liable, though he had exercised due care and diligence
when he selected thegn. The duty continues during the
emplo ment. In Gilman v. Easter R.R.Co., it was said
'such a continuance in employment is as much a brepch of
duitr and a ground of liability as the original employ uent
of an incompetent servant."
(Lanninr v. N.Y.Gent...R.Co., cited above; Gilman v. Eas-
ter, R.R.Oo., 1:3 Allen 4,.
5. If an employee, originally fit, is retained after
18
the employer, with reasonable care, knoAr he has become un-
fit, the employer is liable. Because it will be the duty
of the employer to dismiss from his service any employee,
who from habits of inteniperance or habitual carelessness
or recklessness or otherwise, becomes incorpetent, at the
risk of beinr liable for the consequences of such servants
ne(Tli(Tence to fellow servants, if he does not do so.
C.C.& I.C. &cCo. v. Troesh, 38 Ill. 549; Lanninq v. N.Y.
Cent. R.Th.co., 49 N.Y. 512.)
But as to the duty of the employer to exercise such
reasonable care and diligence in ascertaining Trhat the mn
is, after employed, there is a hard question in practice.
In Chapman v. Erie P.-R.Co. (55 N.Y. 579) it was decided that
good character and proper qualifications once possessed may
be presuined. to continue, and the employer May rely upon
that presumption until notice of a change or know.ledge of
such facts as would be deemed equivalent to notice, or such
at least as would put a reasonable man upon his guard.
This was an action by the administratrix of an engineer to
recover for injuries to the latter in a collision, due to
19
the neg.liqence of a telearaph operator, wvhose duty in the
defendants' employ was that of train dispatcher. The sub-
ject was review"ed. The lower court charged the jury that
"Put, if after a co,,ipetent and proper person is enploired
for such a duty, if his habits becone such that it is un-
safe to trust hin any longer in that capacity, the company
are bound to use, through their proper officers, such reas-
onable care and diligfence iTi ascertaining ivhat the iiqa,n is,
after he is employed, as they would be in his original em-
ployment.u Reversinq this judgement, the court, through
Church, Ch. J., said: "To this there was an exception. We
think this rule of diligence is too broad and can not be
sitst ined. The general rule is, that notice or knowledge
of iTncIompetency is neceqsary to charge the principal with
the dutv of actinq.
6. So-me cases hold that the employer is liable ,'he-
ther he kno i the unfitness or not, if the enployei did not.
( ,,IcDermot v. Hannibal Frc. Co. 87 Mo. 285; )
7. But a single negligent act of an evnployee is not
enough to show him incompetent.
(Balt. e7c. Co. v. Neal ('15 Md. 4S8.)
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(D). Reasonable rules and rerTula, tiOTs, if co-employees
are numerous. It is the employer's duty to prescribe stf-
ficient rule, for the conduct of the businesq.
(R,eqan v. St.Louis .c Co.. 6 .W.Rep. 871 ,go; Sheehain v.
N e-r York 2 ,c Co. 91 7 . 332,9; Abel v. Pre,;. Pc, Del. Rc. Co.
1.08 IN.Y. 5RI.
oulificat ion s of the rule.
1. But be need not adopt the safest syster.
(HanTibal, ,c. Co. v. Kanaley, 17 Pac.Rep. 824, Kans.)
In. Pannibal and St.J.P.Co. v. Kanaley, Mr. Justice
Vlentine, speakinq for the court, said: "The law does not
require a railroad company to direct the movement of its
trains by orders from the train dispatclher alone, nor does
the lar require it to adopt any partlcular form of orders,
or ,nr parti cular system for commanicatinq them. . . . ......
The law only requires that the means adopted shall be
brought to the knowled-cre of its employees, and that they
be reasonablv well calcllated to secure the safety of its
employees, if obeyed. "
(E). Other cases in which the employer is bound.
The employer's liabilitie, are not limited to those case,
21
already discusse, but he Is liable for his neqliiqence in
many other cases.
1. The employer nay be gui]t.yr of actionable neglif6nw9
in exposing persons to perils in his service which, though
open to observation, they, bv reason of their inexperience
or youth, do not fully understand and appreciate, a.d in
consequence of which they are injurerL. Such cases occur
most freauently in the emplo~Tinent of infants. This rule
puts on the e6ployTer a duty to exercise mnore than ordinaryr
care wben he enploys infants or inexperienced !aen; and it
is no doubt necessary to protect theii. In Bartonshill
Coal Co. v. Mc luire (S Macq. H.L. S009,31, Lord Chelns-
ford, in speaking of an injury to a Toun(T girl from exposure
to machinerv in the building ,There she gTas er:ployed, says:
OIt nicght '.rell be considered that, by employinq such a help.
less and imnorant child, the master contracted to keep her
out of harm's yav in assiqning to her any , iork to be per-
formed. The supreme Court of Massachusetts has very prop-
erlv Aid for their protection:-"The notice of "Thich the
defendants ,vere bound to give the plaintiff of the nature
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of the risks incident to the service ',,hich he -undertook,
must be such as to enable a person of his Vouth and inex-
perien ce in. the business intelliientlyr to appreciate the
nature of the danqer attendinr its perfo.-iance. The ques-
of
tion, indeed, on this branch of the case is notAdue care
on the part of the plaintiff, but ,rhetbar the cause of the
injurvr of 'vhicl, by reason of hiD incapacity to understand
and appreciate its lanTrerous character, or the n eclect of
the defendant- to take due precautions to effectually in-
formh hiq thereof, the defendants "ere bound to indemnnif7
hi -i acrianst the consequences. But in deter-iinir this
question it is proper and necessarv to take into consider-
ation not onTy the plaintiff's youth and inexperience, but
also the nature Of the service W.,hich he --ras to perforf,
a. nd the lerTree to -rhich his attentiou,Thile at ,vorkwould
need to be devoted to its perfornance. The obliqation of
the rlefendI,nt, 7,rouild not necessarily be dischlar(Te by mere-
ly informinir the boy that the enplowvnent itself, or a par-
ticular place or ,nachine in the buildinr or roomn in VThich
he lips set to work, 1,Ta,s dancrerous. Mere representation in
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advance that the service (TenerallT, or a particular thin(T
connected w~ith it, Twas danqerous, -mifht (five hi.: no ade-
quate notice or understandinq of the kind and degfree of the
danqer which would neces sarilv attend the actual perfor-
ance of his work."
(Grav,J., in CooribF v. NeTV Bedford Corda(Te Co. 702 M'ass.572
Coolev's on Torts, pp. 852-(354 and note; Sullivan v. India
Manf. Co., 118 Mass. 996; Jones v. Florence Min. Co., 66
Wis. %9, 25 Arn.L.Ren.(n.s. ) 591. )
2. The emnplover mav also be neqli(Tent in commandinq
the emplovee to (To into exceptionall danqeroms places, or
to subject hi!nself to risks which, thougrh he nay be aware
of the daner, are not such as he had reason to expect, or
to consider as beinq v ithin the e.nploynent. In this case
the iinfancy of an emplovee is also of (Treat importance.
( 'alone v. Hsjvlev, 43 Cal. 409; Rv. Co. v. Fort, 17 'Aall.
553; Chicaqo 97-c Ry. Co. v. BaVfield 87 Nich. 205; Lalor v.
Chicaro , c -R.R.Co., 52 Ill. 401, S.C. 4 Au.Pep. 316.)
IT case of Lalor v. Chicaro &c Thy. Co., the declarfi-
tion averred an emplovment of the plaintiff's intestate as
a comnon laborer in the business of lopdinq and unloading
cars, and for no other purpose; and that .hile he Axas en-
gaged in loading a freight car with iron, the deceased. was
ordered byT the superintendent or foreman of the colupanv e'4-
plowed to -rmqanacge, direct and superintend the business of the
co-ipanV about the depot, to couple and connect a freight car
with other cars, contrary to the special engage-nent of the
deceased, -c., in doing ..hich he was crushed to death. This
w,,as held to set out a qood cause for action. "The company
was constructively present, bv and through his officer, and
must be charted accordingly. It was, then, by the direct
colnand of the companT that the deceased was eqposed to this
peril, and one out of the line of the business he had con-
tracted to perform. He -T7as killed by the negligence of the
driver in charge of the locomotive while thus exposed. The
law would be lallnentably deficient did it furnish no remedy
in such a case". But this is a very hard auestion in prac-
tice; sone cases hold that if the ernulove know the danrer to
excuse him.
be incurred, nere fear of discharge for disobedience wil] not,
sussel v. Tillotson, 140 Mass. 201, ad another case
holds that if a 7ature and experienced e:iployee consents
to rio -Tork out-side of that he engTaTed to do, he can not re-
cover. (Cole v. Chicaqo, (,;c. 00.,37 .1.Re. 4, ('Tis.)
8. It is also nerfliTence for -rhich the eiplorer !1ay
be held responsible, if kno,rinq of anv peril which iC
kno',r to the enplovee also, he fails to reriove it in ac-
cordance '\ith assurances naade bv hin to the e.1plovee that
he 'ill do so.
(Patterson v. Ofallace, 1 NIacq. H.L. .748; LaninT v. N.Y.
Cent.R. .Co., 49 7T.Y. 521; Patterson v. Pittsburqh, 'c.
SP.T.0o. 76 Pa. st. 889; CooleTy on Torts, P. 661.)
Modifications of the~ruleQ. )
(1). If the defect or danger is not such that an or-
dinary prudent e-ployee :,rould continue at the work after
proise, the eiplover is not liable.
(Dig. of Col. v. McElliqolt, 117 U.S. G91.)
(2). If in the particular case the business of the
qaster is entrusted to another, his assurance must be
taken as that of the lnaster hinself.
( TVne '-c. ,.R.Co. v. GTildersleeve, .3 2ich. 12; Nelson
v. Tinona ,c. Co., 2) .. R ep. 903('inn.); Ind. qc. Co.
v. TTrtson, 14 .E., Tep. 721(Ind.)
(3). It is sufficient if the proaise is iEe not to
plaintiff individually but to his cranq of -ork~nen in his
presence.
(Atkinson 'c. Co. u. Sadler, 13 Pac. 464Kan.)
4. If an ernplovee is injured bv the negligence of a
servant and that of the niaster conjoined, he myv recover
of the mrister for the injury, for the master is at least
one of the joint wronq-doers in such a case.
(Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Cumiminqs, 106 U.S. 700; Pittsburgh
,%c. Co. v. Flenderson, 37 Ohio, St. 549; Cone v. Del. , c.
Co. R1 N< .Y. .06; Ellis v. N.Y.zrc. Co., 95 N.Y. :546; Strinq-
ton v. Ste, rart, 100 N.Y. 516; Booth v. Boston "c. Co. 73',
-.Y .. ;. Elr v.Locke, 135 Mass. 575.)
(F). Exception to the rule,--Contributory negli7ence
of enplo-yIe. Tbere the ernployer is sued br his eqployee
for an injury ,which it is claiieed has been occasioned by
his neqlirfence, it is veryt properly and justly held that
the plaintiff can not recover if his o,rn nerjliqence con-
tributed -ith that of the defendant in producinq the in-
j Ur v.
(Coolev's on Torts P. 867; Burns 7. Boston ,.c. '.,.Co.,
701 1-ass. 50; Cooper v. Buttler, 103 Penn. St. 412; Lyon
v. Detroit Fc. R.R.Co., 31 lich. 429.)
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Qualifications to the exception. When the ePaolo.ee
had knorle't1 e of danger. As to this case, there are sorhe
conflicting authorities. Enplish rule is that, Trhere a
servaiit is injurel by an instrunent Trhich he is hiaself
using in the course of his eanplo~vent, and of the nature
of vhich he is as nuch arare as his aaster, he can not
recover aqinst the master, not-ithstanding that such in-
stru-neut ',ras not the safest for effecting the object in
Vi eS'.
(iriffiths v. London , St. K's Dock Co., L.R., 12 0.1.1.
492',; Dyer v. Leach, 26 L.J.,E ,,. ,21; Senior v. "lard, 1 E.
& . S 5; Asop v. Yates, 2 H.,'U,. 738; Griffiths v. GidloT,
-. .. N. 343. )
In case of Porter v. Hannibal &c. R.R.Co.,(30 Mfo.
160) an instruction that a rail road co7-pany .,ould not be
liable not'ithstandinq the unsafe condition of the trac]
if plaintiff, a servant, knew, or could)bv ordinary dili-
q ence2 have knourn, the state of the track, '7sS refused and
held that it w,.as not the business of the servant to as-
certain ,Tlether the aachinerv and structure of the road
are defective, but it is the duty of the coTi pany to keep
the.n in a safe condition, and it is resuon-ible for a fail-
ure to do so. But on the other hand, it wiras held that if
the servant has full knorledre and nakes no report or ob-
jection, he takes the risk.
(Krov v. Chica('ro "9c. .. R.Co., ,2 Io. 357; Mcqlrnu v. Bro-
die, 2I Cal. 78.)
mass. court decided nore precisely on this point in Snor .
Hoosatonic 7,v. Co.(8 Allen 450); the court said through
BiTelor, C. J.:."It nay be suirested that the plaintiff
ourht not to recover because he continued in the perfor-
mance of his duties after he was aTrare of the existence of
the defect in the road. There laav be cases where a ser-
vant would be ianting in due care by incurrinr the risk of
injury in the use of defective or i nperfact achinery or
apparatus, after he kne r it -night cause hiia bodily harri.
But -re do not think this case is &ne of that class. His
continua'ce in the emplo'T-ent did not necessarily and in-
evitablv expose hi:i to danrTer."
II. Negligence of Co-eiplovee.
(A). General rule. It 'TfaS a rreneral rule in fanm-
land previous to the first of January, lWi, and in ,lost
of the United States, that an employer is not liable to
his emuployee for danaqes resultinq from the negligence of
his co-eniploVee in tile course of their coi on employlient,
unless the employee causing the injury Txas inco-ipetent to
discharqe his duty, or the euplovee injured was not at the
tithe actinq in his e:iployers eipyloynent.
Oriqin and principles of the rule. This is an ex-
ception to the ffeneral liability of an e'ployer for his
employee's act. For, laerly there 'ras no distinction be-
t-reen a case where the person collitinq the injury is a
third party, and the case ,rhere he is a co-enployee.
This distinction TaS made first in the ,,ell known case ol
Pristly v. For:ler decided 1887 in the English court of
Exchequer.
In this case the plaintiff was engagTed by the de-
fendant a' a butcher. The defendant sent another em-
ployee %ho drove the delivery warron, to accompany and
deliver sone (Toods to the plaintiff; and bvr negligence of
the driver said plaintiff was thrown. to the grround and in-
jured. Therefor4 he brought the suit and obtnined a
verdict against his employer for dana!Tes. 4n appeal ,ras
then taken rhich resulted in the reversal of the jud~rilent.
Lord Abinffer, deliverinq the opinion of the court,
said: mThe *-ere relation of master and servant never can
i-nplv an obligation on the part of the master to take more
care of the servant than he aaTT be reasonably expected to
do of himself. He is, no doubt, bound to provide for
the safety of the servant in the course of his emplovment
to the best of his jud(T-tent, information and belief.
The servant is not bound to risi his safetv in the service
of his ;rnster and .1aio, if he sees fit, decline any service
p
in rhich he resonablF aprehends injurT to hi iself, and in
hjost of the cases in Thich danger iay be incurred, if not
all, he is just a likel to be acou ated -rith the proba-
bility and the e-tent of it as the naster. In that sort
of eiploy ment, especially, Tfllich is described in the de-
claration in this case, the plaiintiff must have knoun as
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whether the van was sufficient,
the master, and probably better, whether it wias over-load-
ed, and whether it was likely to carry him safely. In
fact, to alloTw/ this sort of action to prevaill would be an
encouraaenent to the servant to oit that diligence and
caution wvhich he is in duty bound to exercise on behalf of
his ,aster to protect him against the nisconduct of others
who serve hirn; and which diligence and caution, while they
protect the naster, are a inuch better security against any
injury which the servant mnav sustain by the negligence of
others engaged under the sane master than any recourse a-
gainst his naster for damages could possibly afford.,
This case is, it see,s to -ne, founded on two princi-
ples though not expressed precisely and plainly; 1st., the
master does not -Tarrant to the servant the competency of
his co-ernployees and the sufficiency of the carriage in
which he sends hii- out; in other words, he takes the risk
impliedly in the contract because he consented to the ser-
vice, know.inG such risk, or he has to knol,,,r it in the exer-
cise of ordinary care; 2nd., to allo,r such action is an
encouramnent to the servant to o uit that diligence and
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caution 'Thich he ores; that is acfainst the public policTT.
Above all, it will be re'le,ibered that this case is a qer'n
of the rule.
In the United States, tile first case on the point is
Lfurrav v. S.C.R. .Co., decided in the supreae court of
South Col., Feb., 1841,(i eiullan's lawr 385; 86 Ah. Jec.).
In that case the plaintiff 'ram ena(Ted bv the defendants
on their rail road. The injuries out of which this ac-
tion ,rose P Tere received bV the plaintiff, while encjaced
in the discharge of his duties as firenan, by reason of
the enqine on T.rhich he wTas employed beinq throin from the
track, in consequence of the neqliqence and carelessness
of the enqiueer, wIho had charcje of the encrine, and who
refused and nerlected to lessen the speed or to stop the
engine, after his attention had been called to the obsta-
cles on the track which occasioned the accident. Ver-
dict r~s qiven for plaintiff and defendants :oved for a
n e.r trial.
Judre Evans, deliverina the opinion of the court,
said: OThere is no question that in qeneral, the princi-
pal is liable for the acts of the agent, performed in the
executioi, of his aaency, or in and about the business of
his principal. Thus, the owners of a. rail road would be
liable to passengers for injuries sustained by the neqli-
7ence of an9TT of its servants, because it is i,mplied in the
widertaki-n to carry, not oni.r the road and cars are good,
but that the servants emploved are competent and irill per-
fori their duty. So, also, if one eriploy an arent to ex-
ecute anv work wrherebv a)Tv injurv nay result to a stranger,
the la7'T reouires it to be done with care, and if a stranger
sustains any injury, his principal is liable.(O'Connell v.
Strong, Dud. 265.) But the plaintiff is neither a pass-
encTer nor a stranqer, if he can recover, it must be in his
hermaphrodite character as a passenger-fireman." Thus
the court recognized the doctrine of agency that the em-
ployer is liable for damages caused by the act of his el -
ployee who is actina in good faith within the scope of his
authority for the furtherance of his employer's interest,
but at the sadie time li-iited its application to third per-
sons or passengers in case of com,;ion carrier. The court
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further says: "It was said in the arrgu-ient that if the en-
Gineer had been the oi,,ner of the road be would have been
liable. Of this I apprehend there would have been no
doubt, but then his liabilitv would have arisen, not fromn
his beina the owner, but because the injury arose from his
o-m act. It by no means follows as a consequence that
because he is liable those who employ him are liable also..
A passenger desires to be transported from one
place to another; the carrier undertakes to do this and is
liable if he fail. It is wholly immaterial by whose de-
fault the injury resulted. Passenger has a right to
look to him with whom the contract was made. With the
plaintiff the defendants contracted to pay hir for his
services. Is it incident to their contract that the
company should Guarantee him against the negliGence of his
co-servants?" The court adopted the principle that the
employer does not guarantee to his emploVee the competency
of his co-employee but it is sufficient for him to exer-
cise ordinary care and prudence. And on the other hand
it establishes the doctrine that an employee takes upon
05
himself the risk, ordinary or even extraordinary. It does
not recognize any distinction even when one of the employees
who caused the injury had command over the injured. Thus
the court says: "The engineer no more represents the com-
pany than the plaintiff ......... They are not liable to the
companv for the conduct of each,other, nor is the company
liable to one for the misconduct of another." But
O'Neall, J., dissentin, to the majority, said that, "If it
arose out of any of the old-fashioned modes of conveyance,
could there be a doubt that they would be liable, if the
injury resulted from negligence? ....... Is there any dis-
tinction in law as to effect which the employment of the
plaintiff is to have, in the different kinds of service in
which he 'nay enqaqe? I think there is none ....... I ad-
mit here, once for all, that the plaintiff, like any other
servant, took, as consequence of his contract, the usual
and ordinary risks of his emplorment. What is meant by
this? No more than that he could not clain' for an in-
jury, arainst which the ordinary prudence of his employers,
their agents, or himself, could provide. Atfhenever neff-
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ligence is made out as the cause of' injurv, it does not re-
suit from the ordinary risks of emplowment."
Re further says: "'Then tlheV hire another to enTacre in
a service, where neither his orTn care nor prudence can shield
him from injury, which maV arise from the act of another of
their servants, havinai the control of him, the question of
their liabLlitv deiends upon the care used bV such superior
aqent." This case was decided only from the point of con-
tract and the view" of public policV was not examined. If
this rule is applied extremely, the employee takes upon him-
self all the risks relative to the employment and may have
no remedy aqainst his emplover at all. But the rule was
not firmly established until an elaborate examination of a
wvell knowvn case, FarTrell v. Boston &c.P,.R.Co.(4 \ietc. 49).
Thouih this case comes up some time after those two preced-
inqsj it is considered a leadIinq case, being examined so
completely.
Thig action was to recover the damage, the plaintiff,
an engineer in the employ of the defendant, being injured
through the negligence of a switch tender. The plaintiff
obtained a verdict against the company and an appeal -ras
taken.
Chief Justice SharT, delivering the opinion of the
court, says that, "It is laid dom by Bl-lackstone, that if a
servant, bv his negligfence, does any damage to a stranger,
the master shall be answerable for his neglect. But the
damage must be done while he is actually employed in the mas-
ter's service; otherwise the servant shall answer for his
own behavior.(1. Blackstone Cofi. 481; M'Manus v. Cricket,
1 East, 106.) This rule is obviously founded on the great
principle of social duty, that every man, in the 'anarTement
of his own affairs, .,rtiether bv himself or by his ajents or
servants, shall so conduct them as not to injure another;
and if he does not and another thereby sustains damagre, he
shall answer for it. If done by a servant, in the course
of his employnent, and acting ithin the scope of his au-
thority, it is considered, in contemplation of law, so far
the act of the master that the latter shall be ans:,erable
civiliter." Thus he recognized the principle of agency,
but li-iited it to the relation only of strangers. He says:
"this presupposes that the parties stand to each other in
the relation of stranqers, between whom there is no privitr.
....... The mnaxi a respondeat superior is adopted in that
case frori qeneral considerationsa of policyr and security."
And he further says "B~ut this does not apply to the
case of a servant brinjinq his action am-ainst his ovn em-
plover to recover damaTes for an injury arising in the coursq
of the emplo7nent, "here all such risks and perils as the
employer and servant respectively intend to assume and bear
may beref-ulated by the express or implied contract betwrveen
thegn, and which, in contemplation of law, must be presumed
to be thus requlated."
"rhe "eneral rule resultin fromu considerations as
well of justice as of policy is that he who en(Taqes in. the
emplovment of another for perfornance of specified duties
and services, for compensation, takes upon himself the na-
tural and ordinary risks and perils incident to the perfor-
mane of such services, and, in leaalpresumnption, the comp-
ensation is adji-sted accordinqly. And we are not aware of
any principle which should except the perils arising from
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the carelessness and negligence of those T.rho are in the sa:ne
e'1ilomulelt." Thus he folnded, in the first step, the
principle on the around of contract. At this poiit it is
j iist the saine as the Souith Car. case. (Mturray v. South C.
r".P.Co. , I ,! cl[llan$, 85.) Put he considered it also
from another point, that is of public policy and laid, it
seemls to -ne, the io]re weindht on it than on the contract
Vje-,T, to decidle the question, because he thought the im-
plied proise was dravm. fro-i the original vier. He says:
'If w Te look frol consideratiois of justice to those of
policy, they -- ill stronqrlv lead to the same conclusion.
In considerinr the rights and obligations arisinT out of'
particular relations, it is co-mpetent for courts of jus-
tice to regard considerations of policy and qeneral conven-
ience, and to draw from ', then such rules as wfill, in their
practical s,1)plication, best pronote the safety and securivty
of all parties concerned. This is, in truth, the basis
on which implied pron-ises are raised, beirnr duties leaall-I
inferred from a consideration of what is best adapted to
promote the benefit of all persons concerned, under given
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circumstances." And he compared the employer's position
to the conmon carrier's and inn-keeper's so far as that he
ets a compensation for the service and takes the risks
accordingly. Rie observes: "WVhere several persons are em-
ployed in the conduct of one conmon enterprise or under-
taking, and the safety of each depends much on the care
and skill with which each shall perform his appropriate
duty, each is an odserver of the conduct of the others,
can give notice of any hisconduct, incapacity, or neglect
of duty, and leave the service, if the commron employer
will not take such precautions, and employ such agents, as
the safety of the whole party may require. By these means
the safety of each will be much more effectually secured
than could be done by a resort to the common employer for
indemnity in case of loss by negligence of each other."
According to this vie, , it seems to Tne that the employee
takes all the risks of the employment except of the act of
God or of a public enemy. And to apply this principle
extremely, the employee is put on dangerous situation!
Fearing this, Chief Justice Shaw,, added in his conclusion
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that: "We would add a caution aTainst any hasty conclusion
as to the application of this rule to a case not fully
within the same principle ....... We are far from intending
to sav that there are no implied warranties and undertak-
inqs arising out of the relation of master and servant."
Thus the principle stated in the beginnian of this part
was established firmly. But notwithstanding the caution
of the learned judqe the courts which followed the rule
were so perplexed in practical application, because the
rule is rather arbitrary and tends to be so flexible, and
finding a predjudice to the emploVees in many instances,
the courts endeavored to modify the rule, and in England
and in some states statutes were enacted to modify it.
(B). Modification of the rule. To limit the gener-
al rule it is frequently questioned, what is meant by the
phrase "com-mon employi-ent"; in other words, who are the
co-emplovees or fello' servants within the meaning of the
rule; or it may be more clear to say, what is the distinc-
tion between co-employees and vice-principal? This no-
tion ivas observed as early as in the South Car. case.
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(Murrav V .C.R.P.Co., cited ante). In that case the min-
oritV of the court, through Justice O'Neall, said, "The de-
fendants employ the plaintiff to act under the co-.nmand of
another of their servants. In such a ease, the servant in
coMmand is in the place of the employers. W, then they hire
another to enqa(Te in a service, wbhereneither his own care
nor prudence can shield him from injury which may arise from
the act of another of their agents, havin(T control of him,
the question of their liability depends upon the care used
bv such superior aaent." And the courts of some states
followed, subsecnuently, this view. But there are different
lines of dlecisions on this point.
The first of these is that the persons who are employ-
ed in one and the same business under the sa'he employers and
derive their compensation from the same source, are co-em-
ploves. This was adopted in Mass., Ill., Minn., and Eng-
land ,Rc., and beinr quite broad, it works a hardship, espec-
iall in cases of corporation. Hence in England and some
states, a statute was enacted wvhich abrogated the exemption
of the employer's liability.
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Second principle is that the persons who are e'iiploved
in the same business under the comnon employer, are not co-
empIoyees vith those who have the general cortrol of the
work and e-mployees. The U.S. courts and man of the state
courts followred, but some of the state courts limited it to
the case -ifhere they have also power to employ and discharge.
Another line is that the persons are vice-principals
"hile they enqaqe in the performance of employer's duties,
without regard to grade, or rank, or corn-ion object of ser-
vice with a co-employee. AccordinfT to this vier, the
test is whether an act or business is a duty to be perform-
ed personally by the emnplover. The N.Y. courts are fol-
lowinu this principle at present. This is, it seems to
-ae, most reasonable, but we will examine all.
(a). Judicial,--
1. The Mass. rule. The leadinc case on the sub-
ject wras decided in the Mass. court, hence it -nay be proper
order to state first its rule. Chief Justice Shaw ex-
plained in the Farwell case, "When the object to be accom-
plished is one and the samie, wrhen the e-aployers are the
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sane, and the several persons enploved derive their author
ity and conpensation from the satne source, it ,iwoiuld be ex-
tremely difficult to distinguish what constitutes one de-
partment and .hat a distinct department of duty. It
would vary vith the circumstances of every case. If it
were made to depend upon the nearness or distance of the
persons from each other, the question orould inmediatlr a-
rise, how near or how distant must they be to be in the
sarye or different departments. In a blacksmith's shop,
the persons -,rorkinq in the same building, at different
fires, -,av be quite independent of each other, thouqh only
a feVr feet distant. In a rope Aalk several may be at
work on the same piece of cordage, at the same tine, at
many hundreds feet distant from each other and beyond the
reach of sight or voice, and yet acting together.
"Beside, it appears to us that the arguent rests upon an
assulned principle of responsibility which does not exist.
The ;iaster, in the case supposed, is not exempt from lia-
bility because the servant has better .neans of providing
for his safety when he is employed in immediate connection
with those frown whose neqligence he 'iht suffer, but be-
cause the iMXpLied con trs~ct of the -naster does not extend
to indemnify the servant against the nerlirence of any one
but hi~nself; and he is not liable in tort, as for the neq-
ligence of his servant, because the person suffering does
not stand to1lards hici in the relation of a stranger, but as
one whose rights are regulated by contract, express or ira-
plied."
So it has been said that "We must not over-refine, but
look at the common object, and not at the com, non imnediate
object." Thus all persons engaed under the same em-
ployer for the purpose of the same business, however dif-
ferent in detail those purposes nay be, are co-e-nplovees
in a col-aron e~nploynent wjithin the vaeaninq of the rule.
This doctrine is recognized even no ,u in Mass. (Rogers v.
LudloJ- Manif. Co., 144 Mass. 198.) But in this case it
was decided that if the master eliploys a servant to vork
on a machine 7,vhich is so far out of repair as to be dan-
gerous and which has reinained in that condition for a long
tine, he is not relieved from responsibility to the servant
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for an injurV sustained ifhile ,Torking on the machine, merely
by proof that he has entrusted to conpetent servants the
duty of ,iaking ordinary repairs of the machine, and the
keeping of it in order from day to day and has supplied
themn iith suitable neans for that purpose, if it appear
that the servant only7 inspected the machine for the purpose
of keeping it in order so that it ivould do rrood work, TTith-
out regard to its condition ,bs a dangerous machine.
Though it does not say they are not co-employees, the court
afforded the same renedy in effect. It noticed the pre-
judice to exempt the employer fron liability in such a case
but only feared to say expressly against the well decided
terms. It says therefore that, "It is a, settled rule in
this common wealth that all servants employed by the same
master in the conmon service are felloT, servants whatever
may be their grade or rank." The nany courts of Minn.,
Ill., Ind. adopted this doctrine. (14 Minn. 360, 72 I11.256,
28 Ind. 371.) Fraker v. St.Paul &c.Co., 19 T.ilT. 349.
2. The English doctrine. The English doctrine is
the sa'ie -7ith Mass. Lord Cranvorth, in the renouned case
Of Bartonshell Coal Co. v. Reed (3Macq. 295), defines as
follo,,s, "To constitute fello-, laborers within the meaning
of the doctrine which protects the ina,ster fronf responsibil-
ity for injuries sustained by one servant through the virong-
ful act or carelessness of another, it is not necessary
that the servant causing and the servant sustaining the in-
jury shall both be engaged in precisely the same or even
siiilar acts. Thus, the driver and guard of a stage-
coach, the steersinan and ro-oers of a boat, the man who
drawrs the red-hot iron from the forge and those who hamrrmer
it into shape, the engineer and switchman, the man who let
the miners do,,rn into and who afterwards brings theni up from
the miine and the Tminers themselves, all these are fellow.-
servants and co-laborers within the meanina of the doctrine
in question." It has no regard for the rank or grade of
the injured-servant and the negligent servant who caused
the injury. And in England it was, it see-s to nre, ap-
plied more strictly than it is in Mass., hence the statute
of 1880m was enacted.
(Miorgan v. Vale of Neath R.Co., L.R. 1 Q.B. .149; Allen v.
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Ne-r G'as Co., L.R., 1 i x. ). 251;TTunney v. Mid..R.Co. , L.R.
1 C.P. 291; Felthar v. England, L.R. .2 O. 88.)
In Tunney case, the plaintiff wvas ermployed bv a rail
road coapanv as a laborer, to assist in loading what is
called "pick-up train", with materials left by plate layers
and others upon the line. One of the terms of his en-
mgrrement was that he should be carried by the train from
Bir-minrhari after his day's work was done, the train byA
which he was traveling can;ie into collision with another
train, through the negligence of the guard 'iho had charge
of it, and the plaintiff was injured. The plaintiff sued
the company, but the court held, that, inasmuch as the
plaintiff vias being carried, not as a passenger, but in the
course of his contract of service, there was nothing to the
case out of the ordinary rule, which excepts a master from
responsibility for an injury to a servant through the neg,-
liqence of a fellow-servant, when both are actincf in pur-
suance of a common ermployment. In Feltha n case, the de-
fendent was the maker of locomotive engines, and the plain-
tiff was in his employ. An engine as beinrr hoisted, for
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for the purpose of being carried away, by a traveling crane
moving on a tramway resting on beams of -Tood, supported by
piers of brick work. The piers had been recently re-
paired, and the brick work uas fresh. The defendant re-
tained the general control of the establishmnent, but was
not present; his foreiaan or manager directed the crane to
be moved, having, just before, ordered the plaintiff to get
on the engine to clean it. The plaintiff having got on
the engine, the piers gave way, the engine fell, and the
plaintiff was injured. Here it wras held that the fact
that the servant -uho was guilty of negligence was a servant
of superior autho3itV5Ir hose 'Itwfail directiolis the other was
bound to obey, wfas innaterial; and that as there was no evi-
dence of personal negligence on the part of the defendant,
and nothing to show that he had employed unskillful or in-
competent persons to build the piers, he was not liable to
the plaintiff.
S. The Ohio rule. The Ohio courts modified some-
wvhat the Mass, rule, and according to its ruling, when an
employer placed one person in his employ under the direc-
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tion of another, also in his employ, such employer is liable
for injury to the person placed in the subordinate situation
by the negligence of his superior. Thus when a rail road
companir places the engineer wnder their employ under the
control of the conductor, who directs oihen the cars are to
start, stop, &c., the company are liable to the engineer for
an injury received, occasioned by the negligence of the con-
ductor, whilst they are both engaged in/their respective em-
ployments.
(Little Maimi R.R.Co., v. Stevens, 20 Ohio 216; Whaalan v.
Mad. Riv. & L.E.R.R.Co., 8 Ohio St. 250; Cleveland &c.R.R.
C0o., v. Kear, 8 0. St. 9,02.)
In 7haalan v. Mad. Riv. R.c. o it was decided that
wbere a servant is injured in his person through the care-
lessness of a fellow servant engaged in a common business
and emplovment, and no relation of subordination or subjec-
tion existed between themg, and the emnployer is hiriself
guilty of no fault, such emnployer is not responsible for
such injury.
In Cleveland &c. T?.R.Co. v. Kearf, it was decided
that he(employer) can not divest hiziself of this obligation
by Co,iiitina its control to another, but he still re~ains
liable, upon the mnaxi'i respondeat superior, for such injury
as arise frori the negligence or carelessness of his agent
while en(racred in the prosecution of a business.
Thns the Ohio courts recoqTnized rank and grade of
servant eriploved in one and the sarne business, and those
,ho have control and superintendence over another stand in
the place of the employer so far as his liability is con-
cerned althourrh do not sait expressly they are not co-em-
ployees with others under their control.
4. The U. S. :Courts rule. The U. S. Courts' rule
is almost the equal with the Ohio rule but it does not rec-
oqnize in effect the relation of fellow servant in case in
,ahich the Ohio courts do. Thus in Chicago &c. P.R.Co. v.
R oss, it decided,-- a conductor of a rail road train, who
has the riqht to coanmnand the mnoveent of the train and to
control the persons e iployed. upon it, represents the conu-
pan while performincr those duties and does not bear the
relation of fellowv servant to the enqineer and other enj-
ployees of the corporation on the train.
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(Chica(To &C. R.R.Co. v. Ross, 112 U.S. 177; Boarginan v. O}ma-
ha Ro.R.Co., 41 Fed.Rep. 67.)
In the former case, Mr. Justice 1Field, delivering the
opinion of the court, said, "Ther.? is, in our judnrent, a
clear distinction to be nade in their relation to their
common principal, bet-ween servants of a corporation, exer-
cising no supervision over others engaged wJith the-1 in the
sane emplovnent, and acents of a corporation, clothed ,,Iith
the control and ranarement of a distinct department, in
which their dutv is entirelv that of direction and super-
intendenc e. "
5. The Texas rule. The Texas courts added a limit-
ation to the U. S. courts rule and it decided that a super-
intending officer is not fellowlv servant with the men of
T.hom he has powrer to emploV and discharge them, but he is
vice-principal.
(Oalveston & c.R.R.Co. v. Smith (Tex.) 13 S.77. 5(32; MJissouri
Pac. R. Co. TT. 7,7_"i!!ji a, I 2 S.V ?8 .
In Miissouri Pac. T.Co. v. Willians, it was decided
that a foreman in the repair department of the shops of a
rail road company, with power to employ and discharqa hands,
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is not the fellow~-servant of those under his control, but
is the representative of the company. The only different
point is that he has the power to employ and also discharge.
3. Th, Ner York rule. In *NTe:. York theere 7,rere three
lines of lecision, first of ThciI is the so called coumnon
eIplovnent test. Coon v. Sirracuse A Utice R.R.Co.,
(. Seld., 492) is the first case on the doctrine; it decided
that a principal is not liable to one of his agents or ser-
vants, for injuries sustained through the negligence of an-
other agent or servant, when both are engagfed in the saine
General business. The plaintiff in this case was a track-
1nan, follorinG with his hand car in the eveninG, in the dis-
charge of his duty, a passenger train, and rhile so engaged
was run over by a train of cars of the defendants called a
stake train, which Tas out of lights, and did not usually
pass at that hour, and the plaintiff had no notice that it
was expected. In Sherman v. Rochester &c.R...Co., (17
N. y. 15s.) it wias decided that a servant who sustains an
injury fro-m the negliqence of a superior agent enceared in
the spie (eneral business can maintain no action afaiu
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their common eraployer, although he vas subject to the con-
trol of such superior aaent and could not quard arainst his
necrlirence or its consequences.
This principle is just the samie as the Mass. and Enrr-
lish rule, and findinT that it works hardship in 'nan T in-
stances, the s,,cond principle -ras soon recognized; that is
the test of grade or rank. Thus in Malone v. FHatha,ra,
34 5.Y.,  (1875) it Tias decided that it is only where the
master -,ithdraws from the nanaffement of the business, in-
trustinq it to a middle man or superior servant; or wThere,
as in the case of a corporation, the business is of such a
nature that the qeneral managTement and control thereof is
necessarilv committed to agenta, that the master can be held
liable to a subordinate for the necli(ent act of one thus
actin .r iirl his steal. And this is equal to the Ohio rule,
but it 7,as considered br the courts that even this doct-
rine does not give adequate remedv in all cases, and the
third and present doctrine ,ras established.
It is that an emplovee, while enqa(ed in the perfornq-
ance of the employer's duties, is a vice-priniepal, without
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regard to grade or rank or comnon object of -<vT crit'i j
co-ePlovee. And since Crispin v. -Babitt (11 N.Y. ,516
1880, the New York courts have recognized only the single
test of this, discarding the other two. That case decided,
(1) the liability of a master for an injury to an eiploV,
occasioned bv the negligence of another ernployee, does not
depend on the grade or rank of the latter, but upoi uP.
character of the act, in the performance of vhich the inju-
rv arises. (2) If the act is one pertaining to the dut7 the
master owes to his servants, he is responsible to theln for
the manner of its performance; but if the act is one per-
t%,ininq only to the duty of an operative, the 3nrlove per-
forrning it, Thatever his rank or title, is a mere servant,
and the mqaster is not liable to a fellow servant for its
improper performance.
(Shehen v. N.Y.Cent.&c.R.T3.Co., 91 Nq.Y.; McCosker v. R.R.Co.
84 N.Y. ,77; Slater v. Jewett, 85 NT.Y., 31; T1ussev v. Coer,
112 W.Y., 314; Birnes v. R.T.Co., 119 N.Y., Q51.)
There is one thing more to be noted, i.e. when a
stranger invited bv a servant to assist him in his ,ork, or
11rho volunteers to assist him in his xJork, is, wkile giving
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such assistance, injured by the negligence of another ser-
vant of the same emplo yer, ,rhat is liabi1ity of tIat 3I ploy-
or towards hirn. In this case he is considered to be a
servant PVV tem ore or in the sane position as if he were
a servant, and no action ,rill lie against the emplover.
Raving of the free wirill (Though not under contract of ser-
vice) he exposed hinuself to the ordinary risks of the work
and mnade hi self a partaker in theiii.
(Potter v. Faulker,(18,31) Ex.Ch. 1 B.& S. .800; 31 L.J. ;Q.B.
30, Degq v. M.R.Oo., 1 T.9, M. 773; Pollock on Torts P.89t,
Underhill's Law of Torts, 4th. Eng. Ed. P.69.)
of~
Such were the results ai' ived at b[ a ni b;^r"authhor-
itie0, e .hol '1, i:rl 1i a'1 v I,-rican, .hic i it se ,s useless to
cite in more detail.
(B). Statutory modifications. But the rule, though
not wholly abrogated, was greatly liinited in application in
England and in some of the U. . It ma7 not be useless
to surnarise here the famous statute of 1880 in England.
This act (43 A 44 Vict. c. 42) is on the face of it an ex-
perinental and empirical compromise between conflicting in-
It is temporary, being enacted only for seventerests.
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vear-; and the next session of Parlianent, but it beinqj use-
ful, Parliagiient in 1.88 determined to continue the act.
The effect is that a "work:"an" T ithi1 the meaninrq of the
act,-- any (1) rail'TaT servant, (9) laborer, (3) servant in
husbandry, (4) journeyrimn, (5) artificer, (6) handicrafts-
man, (7) niner, or () other person en(Taffed in manual labor
(not beinq a domestic or menial servant)-- is put as against
his employer in approximately the same position as an out-
sider as regards the safe and fit condition of the material
instrunents, fixed or movable, of the employer's business,
or may sue his employer as if the relation of 'mster and
servant did not subsist bet,'reen them (sect. 1) for any per-
sonal injury caused by any of the reasons prescribed in sec.
1. subs. 1, sect. 2, subs. 1, sect. 1, subs. 2, 2 , 4, 5 >
sect. 2, subs.2 . It provided also that the servant can
not recover if he kne~r of the defect or neglliqence, and did
not complain to the master or mana qer within a reasonable
ti-Te, unless he knewi that the naster or manaqer wxar aware
of it. (Sect. 2, subs. 3.) It requlated, Ioreover, a-
nount of danaCes (Sect. 3, 5.), limit of tiie for conrienc-
ing action (Sect. 4,7) and mode of trial (Sect. P)).
In the United States, (a.,(l97B), Kans. (8'74),
T8.I. (18), Miss. (1,0), and lq. (1"10) issued stt, , utes
of Fi Iilar nature. But I have 110 rooa to reTnark. French
law,. does not recogfnize the exenption of eiployer's l ,biliKv.
(Coi.Cir. ,Art. 1804, Sac.3). The Japanese ne-,v civil code,
follo .rinq the French principle, does not also recognize the
distinction of employer's liability between Liability for a
servant and for a stranTer. (Civ.Cod.,rt.273)
a 0 n c 1 11 s 1 0 n .
w-e, comingr to the conclusion, vrill see that there are
foir steps on the subject under consideration which cover
the present condition:-
First, there is the general rule of an employer's
liability for his employees.
secondly, the irnmunity of the dmployer where the per-
son injured is also his servant.
Thirdly, the judicial modification of the immunity
of the employer, that is , pn exception or li;iitation to the
second.
Fourthlv, the statultory modification s of the iinunitT
of the emplo3Ter.
In F1VnqIand, the tendeicir is rather aqfAinst the eri-
ploVet's interest and alnmost gll the liti(Tation upon the Act
has been. caused eitlier byT its minute provisions as to notice
of action, or bv desperate attempts to evade those parts of
its lan(uage , hich are plai enough to cornon sense. But
in the United States it is fortunatel'y, it see--.-s to ;e, on.
the contrary; still there are so maany different.opinions as
to the test of fellow'r servant within the meanin.. of the rule.
Even a-well settled principle of la,, works prejudices, ir
manv instances, to ppply practically, because lav is a dead
thinr, nTd onlV effectual bv the help ol judicial officers.
More especi,117, in an applicatior of such umnsettled or so
flexible, thouffh to saV settled, coctrine, judqes, larvers,
and evervr body mnut be careful in each case to be supported
by justice and public general convenience.

